Colby College

Digital Commons @ Colby
Honors Theses

Student Research

2021

Pollen: A Secure, Decentralized Wireless Communication Platform
Max Perrello
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Colby College theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed or downloaded from this
site for the purposes of research and scholarship. Reproduction or distribution for commercial
purposes is prohibited without written permission of the author.
Recommended Citation
Perrello, Max, "Pollen: A Secure, Decentralized Wireless Communication Platform" (2021).
Honors Theses. Paper 1310.
https://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/1310
This Honors Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at Digital
Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Colby.

1

Pollen: A Secure, Decentralized Wireless
Communication Platform
Max Perrello, Student, Ying Li, Advisor
Abstract—In this article, we detail an encrypted, internet-independent messaging platform, of which we built a prototype. This thesis
also describes the challenges faced in the process, as well as potential future enhancements.
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I NTRODUCTION

O

N any given day, if one refers to netblocks.org, they can
see a number of countries in which the government
has decided it doesn’t want its users accessing the free
and open web. If you’re an oppressive government, and
you’ve found yourself reading this because you decided to
enter a digital lockdown, you’re in good company! Whether
you’re currently conducting a military coup, attempting to
brainwash your citizens, or just doing some run-of-the-mill
election rigging, you and the many, many other governments pulling this crap are in for a treat–I’ve built a platform
to help your citizens circumvent your tyranny! In fact, to
answer @ajiswriting’s question: yes—my thesis will defend
me, and hopefully many others [1]!
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I MPLEMENTATION

BACKGROUND AND M OTIVATIONS

Today’s digital messaging, whether it runs on a peer-to-peer
network or a centralized server, is still reliant on sprawling,
interconnected networks. A broken link in these networks
could cut users off from the rest of the world, and even
make localized communication more difficult (think—when
WhatsApp goes down, does it continue working locally, or
is it down for everyone?). Finally, many communication
platforms (e.g. Facebook Messenger) also relegate privacy
to the back burner, or pretend the concept doesn’t exist
altogether. This is where my thesis comes in: Pollen is a
cross-platform application that allows users to communicate
securely, without reliance on the Internet or any alternative mesh network. Instead, messages are exchanged asynchronously, through a series of independent nodes. Messages propagate across the independent nodes in a process
akin to that of the way bees pollinate flowers: any time a
user interacts with a node, the user also receives unreadable
(encrypted) copies of messages sent by other users, and then
distributes them to a certain number of other nodes they interact with. Such a system is capable of functioning with any
tiny number of users, and scaling to accommodate much
more. If you’re getting to this point with zero understanding
of my project, that’s okay—it will get both better and worse!
Expect that this is not a conventional thesis: I will do my best
to make things reasonably-comprehensible, but only when
doing so is not at the expense of a real explanation.
•
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There are two major applications that run the Pollen platform: the Node and the Client. Each of these applications
is broken down into a handful of major components, all
of which are well-commented throughout the code and
documentation. Here, we will stick to a reasonably-high
level explanation, but the documentation should provide a
fuller picture if so desired: Nodes, at least in their initial conception, are intended to run on existing wireless networks,
like those found at coffee shops. Under normal circum-
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Fig. 1. An actively-running node, with message details.

stances, these networks provide public access to the Internet,
but in an Internet shutdown situation, they still function
as a local network, and can facilitate interaction between
users who connect specifically to that wireless access point.
Nodes are entirely independent and self-sufficient, but are
also interoperable with other independent Nodes. Each one
functions as a “dead drop,” meaning they facilitate an
asynchronous exchange of messages (see Fig. 1). In the simplest exchange, a sender (whom we’ll call Client A) “drops
off” their message at a Node, and Client B (the intended
recipient) “picks up” the message from the same Node at
a later time. In this example, the Node can be thought of
as a simple mailbox, in which users leave messages for one
another. However, in a more complex example, a Client has
two responsibilities: sending and relaying messages. In this
example, a sender (we’ll call them Client A) drops off the
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initial message, intended for Client B. Another user (whom
we’ll call Client C), who happens to interact with the Node,
picks up a copy of the message. Client C then drops the
message off at a predetermined (as it stands, 10) number of
other Nodes, meaning that Client B (the intended recipient
of that message) can pick it up across a reasonably-wide
geographical area. This exchange is analogous to the way
bees pollinate flowers, hence the name of the app. It’s important to note that none of these message exchanges happen
manually—users send and receive messages the same way
they would on WhatsApp, Signal, or iMessage (as seen in
Fig. 2), it just so happens that nothing is transmitted unless
one interacts with a node. This is also true of users who help

do is not deliver it. In practical terms, this means that the
only person who can “read” a message is the person whom
that message was “addressed” to, and because messages are
also signed by recipients, modification/replacement of that
message is impossible without detection.
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There were a number of challenges I faced in building
this application. For the sake of brevity (as well as saving
face—if you want to see the errors caused in part by my
stupidity, see my initial presentation), I’ll only detail the
two most prominent technical challenges I faced: First and
foremost, release compilation did not go well. This may
be obvious to you when I tell you I was trying to build a
fairly complex, fully cross-platform application in Python
[4], but at this point, that’s neither here nor there. I’ll give a
lot of credit to the Kivy community, who spent reasonablysubstantial amounts of time helping me fix my build scripts.
However, I do want to say that, in my view, aside from
simple projects, it probably doesn’t make sense to build any
major mobile applications in Python, or at least not on the
assumption that you’ll be using Kivy to run the frontend
and backend locally on each device. Needless to say, I spent
a great deal of time trying to get my releases compiled,
even after I thought I’d completely finished my app. Who
knows, maybe that’s par for the course—this is the first
major application I’ve built myself.
The other major challenge I faced, and also haven’t really
solved, is data persistence. I’m ashamed to admit it, but as
it stands, Pollen dumps a serialized instance of the client
object to local storage, every time it’s modified. Effectively,
instead of efficiently storing messages and other app data in
an organized table, I’m just saving the entire app, every time
anything is modified. The story there is one of inexperience
and lack of time—I’m aware that by storing unencrypted
data locally (at least for Clients, the Nodes have no such
access), I’m opening users up to vulnerabilities in which
other, malicious applications can access that data on their
device. Thus, while the data certainly needs to be stored
properly in a database, I also want to make sure that that
database is unreadable to all other local applications. For
the sake of a proof-of-concept (especially when I do actually
need to do a ground-up rebuild of everything else in order
to build decent releases), using Pickle to dump the client
data periodically seems relatively reasonable to me. So sue
me. A more complete log of the challenges I’ve faced can be
found in the issues on the Pollen GitHub Repository.
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Fig. 2. Client home screen, with a number of active conversations.

propagate other users’ messages on the network—when
they interact with a node, they simply exchange their own
messages, and the app handles the pickup and subsequent
redistribution of messages entirely in the background. Further, these messages are fully encrypted in transit, using
PGP [3], meaning that a malicious Client or Node on the
network is theoretically powerless to read the contents of
or otherwise alter a given message—the worst they can

C HALLENGES

F UTURE E NHANCEMENTS

Finally, there are a number of avenues for potential enhancements, once the rebuild is complete (or someone somehow
convinces me I should stick with Python). One of these
expansions is the addition of Message Receipt Indicators.
I anticipate some issues with nodes being overburdened
by duplicate messages, since there is currently no way
of communicating across the network that messages have
been successfully delivered. This creates high potential for
“orphaned” messages that stick around unreceived, until
they are eventually deleted by the Node (30 days later).
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This also worsens the platform’s resistance to potential
DOS (Denial of Service) attacks, in which malicious users
could flood the network with useless messages, each of
which is unable to be deleted for a given period of time.
This leads into another potential enhancement: Trust Scoring/Certification—”hive” (groups of nodes) operators could
sign off/vouch for nodes, using a process similar to my
implementation of a decentralized vaccination passport [5].
At a high level, by deeming certain keys more trustworthy,
and allowing them to sign off on other public keys, one can
enable a sort-of vouching process for Nodes, and potentially
for users as well. Taking advantage of Message Receipt
Indicators is also a plausible option here: Clients could
automatically sign off on a Node upon successful message
exchange, enabling other Clients to build a trust score for
Nodes. This creates the potential for trust score thresholds,
which could be automatically set for less-technical users, in
order to ensure that their messages are delivered. There are a
lot of ways this could be expanded, each of which opens up
other possible problems and methods for abuse. Another enhancement that I’d like to provide is an Alternative Syncing
API, which would allow “hive” operators (administrators
running groups of Nodes) to implement alternative message
propagation/synchronization methods, without modifying
the source code on a case-by-case basis. A few ideas for
alternative syncing include: a LoRa intranet, BLE mesh
network, direct to internet, etc. Networks like these might
also take advantage of another undeveloped improvement:
Public Bulletin Boards, on which a cache of unencrypted
messages could be stored, syncing to every Client upon
connection to a given Node. However, such a system offers
particularly high potential for abuse, given that I’d like
to minimize the rate at which disinformation and rumors
can spread, like those caused in part by WhatsApp massforwarding and subsequent lynchings in India [2]. Finally,
Substitute Installation Methods are a definite improvement
I’d like to pursue. Given that there is scarce pre-planning in
a situation that might require the usage of Pollen, it might
be tough for users to actually install the app, given that
conventional distribution methods mostly rely on Internetbased stores, like the App Store or Google Play Store. This
also means that there needs to be a way for users to verify
their installation, either with the help of other users or
with Nodes, that could verify that an app version hasn’t
been tampered with, in order to avoid the distribution of
malicious source code.
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C ONCLUSION

Overall, the purpose of Pollen is to provide a secure, decentralized alternative messaging framework—one that is not
reliant on the Internet, for a number of reasons. My hope is
that, despite my probably-poor implementation, by creating
a fully-open source project like this, and by embedding my
relatively-novel ideas, I will open avenues for those better
than me to learn from my mistakes and create a system
that will have a net positive impact on the world. Here’s
to hoping.

A PPENDIX
A DDITIONAL S CREENSHOTS

Fig. 3. Client compose screen.
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Fig. 4. Client conversation screen, with a few outgoing messages.
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